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known as NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd.); RIVER THAMES 
INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.; SCOTTISH LION 
INSURANCE COMPANY; SPHERE INSURANCE COMPANY 
LTD., (now known as Sphere Drake Insurance plc); ST. 
PAUL INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. 
(formerly known as St. Katherine Insurance Co. Ltd.); 
SWISS UNION GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.; 
MITSUI MARINE & FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 
(EUROPE) LTD. (formerly known as Taisho Marine & Fire 
Insurance Company (U.K.) Ltd.); TOKIO MARINE & FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY (U.K.) LTD.; TUREGUM 
INSURANCE COMPANY; UNIONAMERICA INSURANCE 
COMPANY LTD.; WORLD AUXILIARY INSURANCE 
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       Washington, D.C. 20006 
 
        Attorneys for Insurance 
        Environmental Litigation 
        Association, Amicus Curiae 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. 
 
This appeal marks the second appearance of this case 
before our Court and comes after more than nine years of 
litigation.1 Seeking indemnification for costs connected to 
the environmental cleanup of its Bridgeport, New Jersey, 
facility, Chemical Leaman initially filed this declaratory 
judgment and damages action against its primary and 
excess insurers in April, 1989. 
 
Chemical Leaman is a tank truck company specializing in 
the transportation of various chemicals and other liquids. 
Since 1960, it has provided tank truck cleaning services at 
its Bridgeport truck terminal facility. In 1969, the New 
Jersey Department of Health ordered Chemical Leaman to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A more detailed history of this case is found in the prior published 
opinions. The District Court's pre-trial opinions are reported at Chemical 
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 788 F.Supp. 846 
(D.N.J. 1992) and Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 817 F.Supp. 1136 (D.N.J. 1993). Our initial opinion in this case was 
vacated on a petition for rehearing en banc. See Chemical Leaman Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 68 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1995), vacated 
68 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1995). Our subsequent opinion is published at 89 
F.3d 976 (3d Cir. 1996). The District Court's opinion following remand is 
reported at Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
978 F.Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1997). 
 
                                4 
  
construct a waste water treatment and/or disposal plant to 
alleviate the strong odors emanating from the on-site ponds 
and lagoons where Chemical Leaman disposed of water 
from the cleaning process. Chemical Leaman continued to 
use the ponds and lagoons system until it installed a water 
treatment system in 1975. By 1977, Chemical Leaman had 
drained and filled the ponds and lagoons. 
 
In 1981, the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection ordered Chemical Leaman to investigate the 
extent and degree of groundwater contamination at and 
around the Bridgeport site. The investigation revealed that 
the ponds and lagoons were primary sources of 
groundwater contamination. In 1984, the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") placed the 
Bridgeport site on the National Priorities List of Superfund 
sites pursuant to Section 105 of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabilities Act 
("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. S 9605. The EPA alleged that 
Chemical Leaman was strictly liable for injury to, 
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, as well as the 
reasonable costs of assessing such damage to natural 
resources, and for all costs of removal or remedial action 
incurred by the United States or the State of New Jersey. 
 
In July 1985, Chemical Leaman entered into a consent 
order with the EPA, admitted liability under CERCLA, and 
agreed to remediate the Bridgeport site or pay for its 
remediation. Additionally, this order directed Chemical 
Leaman to undertake a Remedial Investigation and 
Feasibility Study ("RI/FS") of the groundwater. Chemical 
Leaman has incurred substantial costs in conducting this 
study and expects to accrue considerable future removal 
costs and damages. 
 
After entering this consent order, Chemical Leaman 
notified its various insurers. Chemical Leaman had 
purchased comprehensive general liability ("CGL") policies 
from Aetna, its primary insurer, for one-year periods 
covering April 1, 1959, through April 1, 1985. Under these 
policies, Aetna agreed to pay on behalf of Chemical Leaman 
all sums that Chemical Leaman became legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of property damage. Additionally, 
Aetna agreed to defend Chemical Leaman in suits seeking 
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recovery for such property damage. From April 1, 1971, 
through April 1, 1985, Aetna's policies contained a 
pollution exclusion, indicating that the policies did not 
apply to the discharge of pollutants unless such discharge 
was "sudden and accidental." Chemical Leaman had also 
purchased multi-year excess liability insurance policies 
through Lloyd's insurance market spanning the period April 
1, 1958, through April 1, 1986. These excess policies 
covered property damage but did not contain a similar 
defense obligation. The excess policies covering April 1, 
1971, through April 1, 1985 contained pollution exclusions 
similar to those in Aetna's CGL policies. 
 
When these insurers denied coverage, Chemical Leaman, 
a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business 
in Pennsylvania, filed suit against Aetna, a Connecticut 
corporation with its principal place of business in 
Connecticut, and "Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London 
subscribing to Insurance Policies [specifically enumerated]." 
(LMIa47) The complaint claimed that diversity jurisdiction 
was proper and alleged that "Certain Underwriters" were 
"various insurance companies organized and existing under 
the laws of the United Kingdom." (LMIa48) 
 
On August 9, 1989, the parties stipulated to a change in 
the complaint "substitut[ing] `Robin Anthony Gildart 
Jackson, an Underwriter at Lloyd's, London on behalf of 
himself and all other Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 
subscribing to [specifically enumerated policies], [and forty 
specifically named insurance companies]' in place of and 
instead of defendants `Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 
London subscribing to Insurance Policies [specifically 
enumerated].' " (LMIa57-59) The stipulation stated that any 
final judgment against Jackson would be binding on those 
underwriters subscribing to the enumerated policies and 
thus within the scope of Jackson's purported 
representation. In a similar vein, the stipulation indicated 
that a final judgment in favor of Jackson would inure to the 
benefit of those same underwriters.2  Jackson, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The amended stipulation also included several additional policies 
within the scope of Jackson's purported representation and stated that 
these underwriters would be bound or benefitted by a final judgment for 
or against Jackson. 
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underwriters he is alleged to represent, and the specifically 
named insurance companies are underwriters of Chemical 
Leaman's various excess policies purchased through Lloyd's 
insurance market. This stipulation was signed by the 
attorneys for Chemical Leaman, Jackson, and the named 
insurance parties. On August 29, 1989, the District Court 
entered an order amending the complaint and designating 
Jackson and the named insurance companies (hereinafter 
collectively "the excess insurers") as defendants. 
 
Following extensive discovery, the parties filed cross- 
motions for summary judgment on various grounds. The 
District Court held that New Jersey law governed the 
insurance policies at issue. See Chemical Leaman Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 788 F.Supp. 846, 850- 
51 (D.N.J. 1992). The primary and excess insurance 
policies were standard form "occurrence-based" policies, 
meaning that they insured against "occurrences" as defined 
in the policies. The District Court concluded that Chemical 
Leaman bore the burden of proving an occurrence. See 
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
817 F.Supp. 1136, 1143-44 (D.N.J. 1993). And because 
Chemical Leaman's insurance policies defined "occurrence" 
as an event neither expected or intended, the Court 
concluded that Chemical Leaman also had to prove that it 
did not subjectively expect or intend the property damage 
for which it sought coverage. See id. at 1144.3 
 
Furthermore, the District Court concluded that, under 
New Jersey law, the "continuous trigger" theory of liability 
would apply and trigger a particular insurance policy if (1) 
damage took place during that policy year; and (2) the 
damage in that policy year was part of a continuous and 
indivisible process. See id. at 1153-54. At the time of trial, 
New Jersey's continuous trigger law indicated that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The pre-1961 policies insured against "accidents" as opposed to 
"occurrences." New Jersey law defines the term "accident" in the 
accident-based policies in substantially the same manner as the 
definition of an "occurrence" in the occurrence-based policies--an event 
neither expected nor intended by the insured. Thus, the District Court 
concluded that Chemical Leaman bore the same standard of proof under 
both types of policies. See 817 F.Supp. at 1148. The insurers did not 
challenge that holding on appeal. See 89 F.3d at 982 n.2. 
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insurance policies so triggered were jointly and severally 
liable to policy limits for all damages resulting from that 
occurrence, including damages that occurred before and 
after the policy period. See id. at 1153. Because Chemical 
Leaman began depositing contaminants into the ponds in 
1960 and did not contest the insurer's assertion that the 
contamination began to migrate to the groundwater 
immediately, the District Court ruled as a matter of law 
that damage had occurred to the soil and groundwater in 
the 1960-1961 policy year. See id. at 1148. The District 
Court did not discuss whether the same contamination 
immediately spread to the wetlands. 
 
Once a policy was deemed triggered, the District Court 
concluded, the insurers bore the burden of proving that 
coverage was precluded by an applicable pollution 
exclusion. See id. at 1157. Finding the record replete with 
evidence that Chemical Leaman intended to discharge 
pollutants into the soil at the Bridgeport site, the Court 
granted summary judgment under the pollution exclusion 
to the insurers on Chemical Leaman's claims for soil 
damage after April 1, 1971. See id. The District Court 
denied summary judgment under the pollution exclusion 
with respect to groundwater contamination, and did not 
address contamination to the surrounding wetlands. See id. 
 
Based on the District Court's legal conclusions, the jury 
was asked to respond to a series of special interrogatories.4 
The jury found that property damage had occurred to the 
soil in every policy year between April 1, 1961 to April 1, 
1971;5 to the groundwater in every policy year between 
April 1, 1961, to April 1, 1981;6 and to the wetlands in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Chemical Leaman originally sought coverage from its insurers under 
the policies covering years 1960-1985. As we noted in our first opinion, 
the parties appear to agree that Chemical Leaman dismissed its claims 
under the 1981 to 1985 policies. See 89 F.3d at 983 n.4. 
 
5. Because of the District Court's determination that the pollution 
exclusion barred coverage for soil damage after 1971, the jury was not 
asked to determine whether soil damage occurred after that time. 
Additionally, as noted above, the District Court had previously found 
that soil damage occurred in the 1960-1961 policy year. 
 
6. The District Court had already concluded that groundwater damage 
occurred in the 1960-1961 policy year. 
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every policy year between April 1, 1961, to April 1, 1978.7 
For every year in which property damage to a particular 
medium occurred, the jury also found that (1) the damage 
was part of a continuous and indivisible process; and (2) 
Chemical Leaman did not expect or intend to cause that 
damage at the time that it occurred. Furthermore, the jury 
found that Chemical Leaman did not intend or expect to 
discharge pollutants into the groundwater between 1971 
and 1981, but did find that Chemical Leaman intended and 
expected to discharge pollutants into the wetlands between 
1971 and 1978. 
 
Based on its own legal conclusions and the jury's verdict, 
the District Court issued a judgment order on April 7, 
1993. This order proclaimed that Chemical Leaman was 
entitled to recover "the full amount of any and all costs of 
investigating and remediating" soil, groundwater, and 
wetlands contamination at Bridgeport. (JA30-32) Moreover, 
the order provided that the 1960-71 Aetna and excess 
insurance policies were jointly and severally liable up to 
their policy limits for investigation and remediation costs 
connected to soil contamination; that the 1960-81 policies 
were jointly and severally liable up to policy limits for 
groundwater contamination; and the 1961-71 policies were 
jointly and severally liable up to policy limits for wetlands 
contamination. 
 
Aetna and the excess insurers appealed to this Court. 
Following oral argument but before we issued our decision, 
Chemical Leaman entered into a settlement agreement with 
Aetna. In this agreement, Aetna agreed to pay Chemical 
Leaman $11,500,000 to settle Chemical Leaman's claims 
against Aetna based on its 1959 to 1985 CGL policies. This 
agreement purported to settle not only Chemical Leaman's 
claim for damages and indemnification related to the 
Bridgeport site but also its claims against Aetna involving 
numerous other contaminated sites.8 Chemical Leaman and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The jury specifically found that no property damage occurred to the 
wetlands in the 1960-1961 policy year or in the 1978-1981 policy years. 
 
8. On October 6, 1994, Aetna had filed a declaratory judgment action 
against Chemical Leaman and Chemical Leaman's excess insurers in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
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Aetna allocated the $11,500,000 settlement amount among 
the various contamination sites; $5,226,750 was allocated 
to Bridgeport.9 Moreover, Chemical Leaman and Aetna 
agreed that this settlement exhausted Aetna's CGL policies 
covering April 1, 1959, to April 1, 1985. Because of the 
settlement, Aetna withdrew from the appeal and is no 
longer a party to the dispute. 
 
On June 20, 1996, a panel of this Court affirmed the 
District Court's judgment "except as to the allocation of 
liability." (JA98-99) We remanded with instructions that the 
District Court reallocate the damages "among applicable 
polices in accordance with the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
holding in [the intervening case] Owens-Illinois [v. United 
Insurance Co.], 650 A.2d 974, 993-995 (N.J. 1994)." (JA99) 
In Owens-Illinois, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed 
the allocation of liability when the continuous trigger theory 
established the time of an occurrence as spread over a 
series of years. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected 
joint and several liability and instead held that"any 
allocation should be in proportion to the degree of the risks 
transferred or retained during the years of exposure[to 
injurious conditions]. . . i.e., proration on the basis of policy 
limits, multiplied by years of coverage." Id. at 993. 
 
On remand, the District Court heard oral argument and 
accepted briefs on the reallocation of damages. As a 
threshold matter, the District Court concluded that all of 
Chemical Leaman's costs associated with the government- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., No. 
94-CV-6133 (E.D. Pa.). Aetna's complaint enumerated various 
contamination sites for which Chemical Leaman had requested coverage 
and alleged that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Chemical Leaman 
for any claims arising out of these sites. Chemical Leaman 
counterclaimed against Aetna and alleged that Aetna's policies did 
provide coverage for all of the relevant claims. On July 17, 1995, the 
District Court suspended the Pennsylvania litigation pending the 
outcome of the instant case. 
 
9. The amount allocated to each site was determined by estimating the 
cleanup costs by site, calculating each site's percentage of the total 
estimated cleanup cost, and then multiplying this percentage by the 
settlement amount. 
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mandated RI/FS were indemnity costs, rather than defense 
costs, and thus subject to recovery under the excess 
insurance policies. See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F.Supp. 589 594-96 (D.N.J. 
1997). Analyzing the effect of Aetna's settlement on the 
allocation of liability, the District Court concluded that 
Aetna's CGL policies had been exhausted by the settlement. 
See id. at 600-01. As a result, the District Court concluded 
that Aetna's policies and their limits should not be included 
in its subsequent reallocation of liability pursuant to 
Owens-Illinois. See id. at 604. Nonetheless, the District 
Court concluded that the excess insurers were entitled to a 
credit of $11,055,000, an amount reflecting Aetna's 1960- 
1981 per-occurrence policy limits. See id. at 601-03. The 
District Court also determined that this Court's earlier 
opinion precluded any allocation of liability related to soil 
and wetlands back to Chemical Leaman based on the 
liability-phase determinations that pollution exclusion 
clauses in the 1971-1981 policies barred coverage for soil 
and wetland coverage in those years. See id. at 603. 
 
Because the District Court calculated the total Bridgeport 
past indemnity costs as $11,084,226, see id. at 597-98, the 
District Court concluded that the excess insurers were 
responsible for $29,226, the past indemnity costs over and 
above the $11,055,00 credit, and all future indemnity costs 
associated with Bridgeport. See id. at 602. The District 
Court determined that the $29,226 in remaining past costs 
constituted costs attributable to groundwater. See id. at 
610. 
 
The District Court then set about allocating the relevant 
indemnity costs among the excess insurers. In accord with 
its earlier holdings, the District Court concluded that all 
future soil indemnity costs associated with Bridgeport 
would be allocated among the 1960-71 policy years; that 
$29,226 and all future groundwater indemnity costs would 
be allocated among the 1960-81 policy years; and that all 
future wetlands indemnity costs would be allocated among 
the 1961-71 years. See id. at 605. The District Court 
assigned a percentage of the liability for each medium to 
each policy year deemed liable for that particular medium. 
The District Court calculated these percentages by adding 
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up the policy limits of all the excess policies in a particular 
policy year and dividing that amount by the total policy 
limits of all excess policies in all policy years deemed liable 
for that medium. See id. at 605-06; 610-12. 10 Because 
several layers of excess policies overlay the Aetna primary 
policy in each policy year, the District Court directed that 
each layer of excess coverage in a given year must exhaust 
before the next layer of excess insurance would be required 
to begin paying indemnity costs to Chemical Leaman. See 
id. at 606.11 
 
Because a single per-occurrence limit existed in each 
excess insurance policy sold through Lloyd's, even those 
policies with terms greater than one year, the District Court 
was required to address whether the Bridgeport 
contamination should be treated as one occurrence or a 
separate occurrence in each policy year. The District Court 
held that the policies of greater than one year would be 
liable up to the per-occurrence limit for a separate 
occurrence during each policy year. See id. at 608. As a 
final matter, the District Court found that each underwriter 
of the excess insurance policies sold through Lloyd's was 
independently liable for its own share of that policy, and 
thus that defendant underwriters should not bear the loss 
of insolvent underwriters or underwriters not named as 
defendants in the action. See id. at 608-09. 
 
Both Chemical Leaman and the excess insurers appeal 
the District Court's order on remand. The excess insurers 
appeal the District Court's determination that all of costs 
associated with the government-mandated RI/FS are 
indemnity costs subject to recovery under the excess 
insurance policies rather than defense costs. Additionally, 
the excess insurers contend that the District Court erred by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. For example, the total excess coverage in policy years 1960-1971 was 
$131,225,000. Because the excess policies in 1960 offered $1,225,000 in 
coverage, the District Court assigned 0.93% ($1,225,000/$131,225,000) 
of all future soil indemnity costs to the policies in 1960. 
 
11. This vertical allocation, beginning with the lowest policy layer and 
proceeding upward through each succeeding policy layer in a particular 
year, was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116 (N.J. 1998). 
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allocating all indemnity costs related to the soil and 
wetlands to the excess insurers rather than requiring 
Chemical Leaman to absorb a portion of these costs based 
on the applicable pollution exclusion after 1971. Chemical 
Leaman challenges the District Court's award of an 
$11,055,000 settlement credit to the excess insurers rather 
than a lesser credit of $5,226,750, the amount Chemical 
Leaman allocated to Bridgeport in its settlement agreement 
with Aetna. 
 
II. EXISTENCE OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION  
 
Prior to the entry of a final order in the District Court, 
the excess insurers brought the attention of the Court to 
Lowley-Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 166 
(D.N.J. 1995), a declaratory judgment action brought by a 
Lloyd's underwriter in which the Court held that the 
citizenship of all underwriters on a Lloyd's policy had to be 
taken into account in determining diversity jurisdiction. 
The excess insurers simultaneously informed the Court 
that there were underwriters who subscribed to Chemical 
Leaman's excess policies who were residents of 
Pennsylvania and Delaware. However, neither the excess 
insurers nor any other party took the position that the 
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The 
District Court apparently concluded before entering its 
judgment that it had diversity jurisdiction. 
 
Before us, all parties affirm that the District Court had 
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332 and that we 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We 
have conducted our own inquiry, however, as to whether 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court can be 
questioned at this stage of the proceedings and, if so, 
whether it had diversity jurisdiction. 
 
A. No Bar To Judicial Consideration of this Issue 
 
The first issue we face is whether the existence of subject 
matter jurisdiction is an issue open to judicial 
consideration at this procedural juncture. The general rule 
is that "where non-waivable subject matter jurisdiction is 
lacking but not raised, a final judgment has res judicata 
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effect in a subsequent proceeding, and a collateral attack 
based on the want of subject matter jurisdiction is barred." 
Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment 
Establishments, 12 F.3d 406, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Hodge v. Hodge, 621 F.2d 590, 592 (3d. Cir. 1980)). This 
rule applies whether or not the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction was litigated. See id. The logical corollary to 
this general rule is the rule that as long as a case is 
pending, the parties or the court on its own motion may 
raise the issue of federal court jurisdiction at any stage of 
the proceedings. See Depex Reina 9 Partnership v. Texas 
International Petroleum, 897 F.2d 461, 464 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(citing 1 Moore's Federal Practice P 0.60[4] (2d ed. 1981)). 
Specifically, if there is no final judgment outstanding into 
which the defense of lack of jurisdiction can merge and 
proceedings are continuing, res judicata does not operate to 
bar consideration of a challenge to the jurisdiction of the 
court. See id.; DeNafo v. Finch, 436 F.2d 737, 740 (3d Cir. 
1971). 
 
In this case, the District Court entered a final declaratory 
judgment declaring each primary and excess insurer that 
provided coverage to Chemical Leaman during the relevant 
periods jointly and severally liable in accordance with the 
limits of its policy for the entire amount of investigation and 
remedial costs incurred in connection with the Bridgeport 
site. On appeal from this judgment, our opinion stated that 
"[the excess insurers] correctly dispute the district court's 
holding that all policies are jointly and severally liable." 
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 89 
F.3d 976, 995 (3d Cir. 1996). The opinion concludes by 
saying: 
 
       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
       court except as to the allocation of liability among 
       applicable policies. We will remand to the district court 
       for a reallocation of damages among applicable policies 
       in accordance with the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
       holding in Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 993-95. 
 
Id. at 997. 
 
While our opinion said we were affirming the "district 
court," the Clerk's Office's mandate stated the District 
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Court's "judgment" was being affirmed in some respects 
and not in others: 
 
       On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and 
       adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said 
       District Court entered November 18, 1993, be, and the 
       same is hereby affirmed except as to the allocation of 
       liability among applicable policies and the cause is 
       remanded to the District Court for a reallocation of 
       damages among applicable policies in accordance with 
       the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Owens- 
       Illinois, 650 A.2d 974, 993-95 (N.J. 1994). All of the 
       above in accordance with the opinion of this Court." 
 
(JA98-99) 
 
Although our mandate should have stated that the 
judgment of the District Court was reversed and that the 
matter was remanded for further proceedings and the entry 
of a corrected declaratory judgment, the language chosen 
by the clerk must be construed in the context of our 
opinion to mean the same thing. The District Court's 
judgment was clearly not a valid and enforceable judgment 
following our action on appeal. 
 
It is important to note that subject matter jurisdiction 
was not an issue litigated in the first district court 
proceeding. When an appellate court approves something 
the district court has done and not others, issue preclusion 
does foreclose further consideration of an issue on which 
the district court has been "affirmed." However, the 
doctrine of claim preclusion bars consideration of an issue 
not litigated below only if there exists a valid, enforceable 
judgment into which a claim or defense has merged. We do 
not have one here. See International Telephone & Telegraph 
Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 527 F.2d 
1162 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting that because Court of Appeals 
reversed judgment in part, no final judgment existed on 
which defendant could advance res judicata defense). 
 
We are aware that Chemical Leaman terms the 
proceedings on remand as supplemental proceedings after 
the issuance of a final declaratory judgment. This is a 
reference to 28 U.S.C. S 2202. Section 2202 provides that 
"[f]urther necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory 
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judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice 
and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have 
been determined by such judgment." As Wright and Miller 
note, Section 2202 "permits the original [declaratory] 
judgment to be supplemented either by damages or by 
equitable relief " [even] "long after the declaratory judgment 
has been entered, provided that the party seeking relief is 
not barred by laches." 10B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE [hereinafter WRIGHT &MILLER] 
S 2271 at 682 (3d ed. 1998). Chemical Leaman's view of the 
procedural posture of this action is incorrect. The 
reallocation of liability on remand is part of the declaration 
of the "rights and other legal relations" of the parties before 
the court, 28 U.S.C. S 2201, while a motion to recover 
amounts due in accordance with the declaration would 
constitute supplementary relief. See WRIGHT & MILLER 
S 2771, at 682 (supplemental relief, such as damages or an 
injunction, available against parties "whose rights have 
been determined"). 
 
Because we find no bar to our consideration of the 
propriety of subject matter jurisdiction, we now examine 
whether a proper basis exists. 
 
B. Diversity Jurisdiction 
 
When this action was commenced, district courts had 
original subject matter jurisdiction where the matter in 
controversy exceeded $10,000 and was between citizens of 
different States, or between citizens of a State and citizens 
of a foreign state. See 28 U.S.C. S 1332.12 Though not 
constitutionally required, the Supreme Court has long 
insisted, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that 
complete diversity between plaintiffs and all defendants 
exist. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 
(1806). 
 
An understanding of Lloyd's is helpful at the outset. Our 
information concerning Lloyd's comes from the stipulation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The effective date of the 1988 amendment raising the jurisdictional 
amount to $50,000 was May 18, 1989. Because this action was filed on 
April 12, 1989, the $10,000 jurisdictional amount applies. 
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of the parties filed in Lowsley-Williams and relied upon by 
the parties here. Lloyd's is an association that provides the 
physical premises and the administrative services and staff 
to enable insurance underwriters to carry on their 
business. Lloyd's is not an insurance company, but rather 
is an exchange or market where various individuals or 
groups bid on the right to insure a given risk. Lloyd's takes 
no part in the business of underwriting; policies are 
underwritten at Lloyd's and not by Lloyd's. 
 
An individual must pay a membership fee, keep certain 
deposits at Lloyd's, and meet several specific requirements, 
including possession of a certain degree of wealth, in order 
to have access to the Lloyd's insurance market. Once they 
have joined the market, these individuals may underwrite 
risks in this market. The individuals are alternatively 
referred to as members, underwriters, or names. In order to 
increase the efficiency of underwriting risks and to combine 
the resources of numerous individuals, names form groups 
called syndicates. However, syndicates are not legal 
entities. Syndicates do not assume liability or underwrite 
risks; names do. Each name has unlimited personal 
liability yet only to the extent of the percentage share of the 
risk that he or she has assumed. The holders of Lloyd's 
policies thus enter into contractual relationships with 
specific names who have subscribed to the policy for the 
portion of the risk each name has agreed to underwrite. 
 
Within each syndicate, a Managing Agent is responsible 
for the underwriting and management of each individual's 
investments. The Managing Agent receives this authority 
through contracts with each individual. The Managing 
Agent, typically a partnership or limited company, appoints 
one of its employees to serve as the Active Underwriter for 
the syndicate. The Active Underwriter has the authority to 
bind all the individuals in the syndicate. The Active 
Underwriter selects the risks to underwrite, determines the 
conditions to which a risk will be subject, assigns each 
individual in the syndicate a percentage of the risk, and 
decides whether to pay a particular claim. 
 
The complaint originally filed in this case designates as 
parties defendant Aetna and the underwriters at Lloyd's 
who subscribed to Chemical Leaman's excess policies. It 
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alleges that each of these parties has agreed to submit to 
the jurisdiction of any court of competent jurisdiction in the 
United States and has designated Mendes and Mount in 
New York as its agent for service of process. 
 
As we have noted, however, Chemical Leaman agreed 
early in the litigation to amend its complaint. The Amended 
Complaint designates as defendants Aetna, forty insurance 
companies identified by name, and "Robin Anthony Gilbert 
Jackson, an Underwriter at Lloyd's, London on behalf of 
himself and all other underwriters at Lloyd's, London 
subscribing to" Chemical Leaman's excess policies. The 
parties agree that there is complete diversity between 
Chemical Leaman, Aetna, the forty named insurers and  
Jackson.13 A jurisdictional problem would exist only if this 
Court were required to consider the citizenship of the 
underwriters within Jackson's purported representation. 
Given the complaint before us, we are not so compelled. 
 
Chemical Leaman has not brought suit against Jackson 
as an agent of the individual underwriters or against the 
syndicates of which they are members. There are no 
allegations in the amended complaint to support such  
theories.14 The amended complaint is based solely on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. While the parties agree that neither Jackson nor the named 
insurance policies have the same citizenship as Chemical Leaman, the 
complaint, as amended pursuant to the stipulation, does not so allege. 
The plaintiff has the burden of pleading the existence of the court's 
jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, and, in a diversity action, the 
plaintiff 
must state all parties' citizenships such that the existence of complete 
diversity can be confirmed. See 5 Wright & Miller S 1208, at 100 (2d ed. 
1990). We are authorized to permit Chemical Leaman to amend its 
complaint to make the necessary allegations by statute. See 28 U.S.C. 
S1653 ("Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon 
terms, in the trial or appellate courts."). We have previously stated: "It 
is 
not only within the power, but it is a duty, of a federal court to 
consider 
on the merits a proposed amendment of a defective allegation once the 
court's attention is called to the defect." See Kiser v. General Electric 
Corp., 831 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1987). Accordingly, we instruct 
Chemical Leaman to remedy its inadequate jurisdictional allegations. 
 
14. Chemical Leaman's complaint cannot reasonably be read as asserting 
a claim against an individual underwriter as an agent for his syndicate. 
Compare Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Lane, 26 F.3d 39 
(6th Cir. 1994). Nor can it be reasonably read as asserting a claim 
against a syndicate itself. Compare Indiana Gas Co., Inc. v. Home Ins. 
Co., 141 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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excess policies and the underwriter names share no 
common liability under those policies. The only relevant 
allegation is that Jackson subscribed to the excess policies 
in the same manner as all other subscribers, i.e., that he is 
a member of a class of similarly situated persons. Thus, 
while Jackson is sued "on behalf of . . . all other 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London subscribing to" the excess 
policies, the amended complaint identifies no basis for 
binding "all other underwriters" absent a class certification. 
 
There has been no class certification here. Accordingly, 
the only claim against Jackson that the District Court 
could adjudicate was the claim against him in his 
individual capacity. See Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 
(3d Cir. 1973) (treating the action as an individual claim in 
the absence of class certification); Jackson v. O'Bannon, 
633 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1980) (concerning itself only with the 
factual situation involving the named parties since the 
purported class had not been certified and neither party 
raised the class issue on appeal).15 
 
Because Aetna, Jackson and the named insurance 
companies were the only defendants after the complaint 
was amended, only their citizenship and liability amounts 
on the insurance policies are relevant to the exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. In 
reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the fact 
that Chemical Leaman and the underwriters of the excess 
policies have agreed in their stipulation to be bound by the 
judgment in this action for or against Jackson. However, 
this stipulation did not place before the District Court any 
of the underwriters not named in the amended complaint, 
and the judgment of the District Court is not directly 
enforceable by or against them. Accordingly, we do not view 
this voluntary side agreement as depriving the District 
Court of its jurisdiction.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. If the District Court had properly certified a class, the existence of 
complete diversity would be determined without reference to the 
citizenship of the members of the class other than Jackson and the 
named insurance companies. See In Re School Asbestos Litigation, 921 
F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
16. Chemical Leaman states a valid claim against Jackson as an 
underwriter of one or more of its Lloyd's policies. This, accordingly, is 
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III. CHARACTERIZATION OF RI/FS COSTS AS DEFENSE 
       OR INDEMNITY COSTS 
 
Turning to the propriety of the District Court's order on 
remand, we examine the District Court's determination that 
all of Chemical Leaman's mandated RI/FS investigation and 
remediation costs are indemnity costs rather than defense 
costs. Because the excess insurance policies carry only a 
duty to indemnify, and not a corresponding duty to defend, 
the excess insurers would necessarily benefit from a partial 
allocation of the RI/FS costs to defense costs.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
not a situation in which diversity jurisdiction has been manufactured to 
secure an adjudication of a controversy over which a district court would 
not otherwise have diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. S1359 ("A 
district 
court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party by 
assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or 
joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools 
Corp., 913 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that court will abide by 
plaintiff 's election of defendants unless the plantiff impermissibly 
manufactured diversity or used an acceptable device to defeat diversity); 
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968) ("manufactured" 
diversity of citizenship, by appointment of out-of-state guardian to 
prosecute suit of resident minor, did not constitute adequate foundation 
for federal jurisdiction). 
 
Moreover, we perceive no reason why Chemical Leaman should not be 
entitled to sue less than all of the names if it so chooses. According to 
the terms of the Lloyd's policies, the names are liable "each for his own 
part and not one for another." See 978 F.Supp. at 609 (quoting policy 
language). Thus, while the absent names would be proper parties to this 
suit, they are not necessary parties. Complete relief may be accorded to 
those already parties to the action without impairing or impeding the 
absent names' ability to protect their interests and without subjecting 
any party to multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations. See 
Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 19(a); Janney Montgomery Scott v. Shephard Niles, 11 
F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that joint and severally liable obligors 
are 
not necessary defendants under Rule 19(a)). 
 
17. A duty to indemnify requires an insurer to pay on behalf of the 
policyholder all sums that the insurer is contractually obligated to pay 
as damages because of harms or losses covered by the policy. A duty to 
defend obligates the insurer to pay the costs incurred preparing for and 
defending a lawsuit brought against the policyholder. See General 
Accident Ins. Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection (Fairclough), 672 
A.2d 
1154, 1155 (N.J. 1996). 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the 
appropriate characterization of government-mandated 
RI/FS costs in General Accident Ins. Co. v. State Dep't of 
Envtl. Protection (Fairclough), 672 A.2d 1154 (N.J. 1996).18 
Fairclough, the insured, operated a fuel storage business. 
After an act of vandalism caused a discharge of 
approximately 1,300 gallons of fuel oil from Fairclough's 
facility, the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection ordered Fairclough to conduct an RI/FS. 
Fairclough's insurer initially disputed its obligation to 
defend or indemnify Fairclough. However, it later entered 
into a consent order and agreed to indemnify Fairclough up 
to $100,000 and to defend claims related to the oil 
discharge until its indemnity limit was exhausted. After 
paying more than $100,000 in response costs, the insurer 
sought a declaration that it owed no further duty to 
Fairclough in connection with the oil discharge. The 
propriety of such a declaration required an allocation of the 
response costs between the insurer's defense and indemnity 
obligations. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court declined to adopt a 
bright-line rule that all costs associated with a mandated 
RI/FS were either exclusively indemnity costs or exclusively 
defense costs. Rather the Court stated: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The New Jersey Supreme Court decided General Accident in March 
1996, after the District Court's 1993 judgment holding Aetna and the 
excess insurers liable "for the full amount of any and all costs of 
investigating and remediating" contamination at the Bridgeport terminal 
and three months before our first judgment in this case. Because the 
excess insurers did not specifically allege on appeal that the District 
Court's order erroneously required them to cover defense costs, Chemical 
Leaman contended on remand that the excess insurers had waived that 
challenge. The excess insurers countered that they had appealed their 
liability for defense costs in the form of appealing the joint and several 
liability component of the judgment. The District Court did not decide 
this waiver issue and instead properly determined that it was bound to 
revisit the issue in light of the intervening New Jersey Supreme Court 
decision. See 978 F.Supp. at 595. As this Court stated in Air Products 
and Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 F.3d 177, 181 
(3d Cir. 1994), "[w]e agree that a federal court exercising diversity 
jurisdiction is bound to follow the law as decided by the highest court of 
the state even if it has changed during the pendency of the federal 
action." 
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       [W]e believe the only fair result is a balanced solution 
       that takes multiple factors into account. If it is clear 
       that the expenditure clearly kills two birds with one 
       stone in the sense of fulfilling a defense obligation 
       while also relieving the policyholder of a potential claim 
       for damages, the proper solution appears to be a fair 
       allocation of the RI/FS costs between defense and 
       indemnity provisions of the policy. 
 
Id. at 1162. However, to avoid needless litigation in the 
form of a war of experts on the allocation issue, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court--as the District Court correctly 
noted--established a presumption that the costs of an 
RI/FS mandated by a government agency are indemnity 
costs. With respect to this presumption, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
 
       We believe that there should be a presumption that 
       mandated costs are indemnity costs to be allocated to 
       the indemnity provisions of the policy. The burden 
       should be on the policyholder to show that the 
       insurance company has derived an unjust benefit from 
       such an allocation to the extent that it has relieved the 
       insurance company of an expense that it would 
       otherwise have incurred under its obligation to defend. 
 
Id. 
 
On remand, the District Court interpreted this language 
in Fairclough to preclude an allocation of mandated RI/FS 
costs in part to defense costs unless "the insured shows 
that the allocation to indemnity alone would provide a 
windfall to its insurance company." 978 F.Supp. at 596 
(emphasis added). Because Chemical Leaman did not 
contest, but in fact embraced, this presumption, the 
District Court ruled that all of Chemical Leaman's costs 
associated with the mandated RI/FS were indemnity costs. 
See id. 
 
In so holding, however, the District Court failed to 
acknowledge an important distinction between Fairclough 
and the instant action. In Fairclough, the presumption that 
all costs associated with a government-mandated RI/FS are 
indemnity costs cut in favor of the insurer and against the 
policyholder. This is because Fairclough involved an insurer 
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with both a duty to indemnify and a duty to defend. To the 
extent that RI/FS costs were characterized as indemnity 
costs, these costs not only served to exhaust the policy 
limits, but also served to eliminate the insurer's duty to 
defend. In the instant case, the presumption operates in 
favor of the policyholder, Chemical Leaman, and against 
the excess insurers. To the extent that the costs associated 
with the mandated RI/FS are characterized as indemnity 
costs, the excess insurers are obliged to pay these amounts 
pursuant to their duty to indemnify. To the extent that the 
RI/FS costs are characterized as defense costs, the excess 
insurers are relieved of any obligation for these costs. 
Because Aetna paid no defense costs as part of its 
settlement with Chemical Leaman, Chemical Leaman must 
absorb any RI/FS costs characterized as defense costs.19 
 
We do not agree that the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
decision in Fairclough established a presumption capable of 
being rebutted only by a policyholder without regard to who 
is actually aggrieved by such a presumption. Rather, we 
believe that Fairclough should be understood to stand for 
the proposition that a party disadvantaged by the 
presumption that the costs associated with a government- 
mandated RI/FS are indemnity costs is entitled to rebut 
that presumption. Thus, we hold that the District Court 
erred by precluding the excess insurers from rebutting the 
Fairclough presumption. 
 
On appeal, Chemical Leaman does not seriously 
challenge this proposition. Rather, it argues that the excess 
insurers have proffered no evidence relevant to overcome 
the presumption. We disagree. In the context of the 
situation before us, financial responsibility is transferred 
from Chemical Leaman to the excess carriers and Chemical 
Leaman derives an unjust benefit whenever an expense 
that should be allocated to defense costs is instead 
allocated to indemnity. The record indicates that Chemical 
Leaman itself regarded as defense costs many of the 
expenses the District Court assigned to indemnity pursuant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. In the settlement agreement, Chemical Leaman and Aetna allocated 
the entire settlement payment of $11,500,000 to Chemical Leaman's 
indemnity claims under Aetna's 1959-1985 policies. 
 
                                23 
  
to the Fairclough presumption. When it asserted its claim 
for defense costs against Aetna, Chemical Leaman 
characterized numerous items of expense associated with 
the RI/FS as coming within Aetna's defense obligation. 
Additionally, the record contains the affidavit of an 
environmental consultant, Douglas J. Swanson, in which 
the various RI/FS costs associated with the Bridgewater 
contamination are classified as either defense costs or 
indemnity costs.20 We view this affidavit as also providing 
some evidence tending to rebut the Fairclough presumption. 
We do not hold that the excess insurers have on this record 
rebutted the presumption. That is an issue better left to the 
District Court in the first instance. On remand, the District 
Court will also have discretion to determine whether the 
parties should have the opportunity to supplement the 
record now that the presumption has been held to be 
rebuttable by the excess insurers. 
 
Additionally, we note that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has not specified an exact method by which courts should 
attempt to accomplish a fair allocation once a fair allocation 
is deemed necessary. In Fairclough, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court merely stated that: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Swanson classified these costs according to the following guidelines 
set forth in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 928 
F.Supp. 176, 184 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), appeal dismissed, 116 F.3d 53 (2d 
Cir. 1997): 
 
       To the extent that an expense is primarily attributable to remedial 
       investigations--which address the sources and extent of the 
       contamination, whether environmental damages can be mitigated by 
       controlling the sources, or whether additional action is necessary 
       because of migration of contaminants from the site--the expense 
       will be treated as a defense cost. To the extent an expense is 
       primarily attributable to feasibility studies--which comprise plans 
       for selecting and implementing the remediation alternative for the 
       site--the expense will be treated as damages to be indemnified. 
 
While the excess insurers encourage us to adopt Endicott Johnson's 
bright-line rule for allocating costs associated with a mandated RI/FS 
between defense and indemnity obligations, we decline to do so. 
Adoption of a rule that all costs associated with remedial investigations 
are defense costs and all costs associated with feasibility studies are 
indemnity costs would eviscerate Fairclough's starting point that all 
RI/FS costs are presumed to be indemnity costs. 
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        Such disputes seem ideally suited for mediation or 
       arbitration under court-annexed programs of alternate 
       dispute resolutions or on the parties' own initiative. 
       Failing such resolution of the dispute in whole or in 
       part, trial courts (upon recommendation of a master if 
       one is appointed by the court) shall have broad 
       discretion to resolve, based on written submissions 
       without any additional expert testimony, a fair 
       allocation of the costs between the defense and 
       indemnity provisions of the policies. 
 
Fairclough, 672 A.2d at 1162. The Court emphasized that it 
sought, not to simplify the substantive issues, which it 
recognized as intrinsically complex, but rather to "provide 
procedures to simplify their resolution." Id. at 1163. "An 
allocation that is swift, with perhaps a rough measure of 
justice, appears to us to be the best procedure to simplify 
resolution of these issues." Id. Nonetheless, the Court 
enumerated the following non-exclusive factors that it 
deemed relevant to any such "fair allocation" undertaken: 
 
       (1) the relative risk that the [potentially responsible 
       party] bore if it did not produce the RI/FS; for example, 
       how realistic was the threat of treble damages; (2) the 
       extent to which the details of the RI/FS may have been 
       mandated by the environmental agencies; (3) the extent 
       to which the RI/FS studies provide a means by which 
       the insurance company or the policyholder would be 
       relieved of or be able to mitigate potential claims for 
       damages; and (4) the cost of producing the RI/FS in 
       relation to the policy limits provided. 
 
Id. at 1162. 
 
Accordingly, we remand for a determination as to 
whether the excess insurers have sufficiently rebutted the 
Fairclough presumption, and, if necessary, for an allocation 
of the past and future costs associated with the 
government-mandated RI/FS between defense and 
indemnity costs with reference to the above enumerated 
factors and any other factor that the District Court deems 
relevant. 
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IV. SETTLEMENT CREDIT 
 
We now turn to the issue raised by Chemical Leaman on 
appeal. Chemical Leaman challenges the District Court's 
holding that the excess insurers are entitled to a credit 
against their liability in this case of $11,055,000 based on 
Chemical Leaman's settlement with Aetna. The credit 
amount extended to the excess insurers determines at what 
point the excess insurers must begin covering Chemical 
Leaman's indemnity costs associated with Bridgeport. 
Chemical Leaman contends that the excess insurers should 
only receive a credit of $5,226,750, the amount of the 
settlement that Chemical Leaman and Aetna allocated to 
the Bridgeport site in their agreement. 
 
In support of its argument, Chemical Leaman asserts 
that the limits set forth in Aetna's CGL policies are both 
per-occurrence and aggregate limits.21  It is undisputed that 
Aetna's full per-occurrence policy limits applicable to 
Bridgeport total $11,055,000.22 Because Chemical Leaman 
maintains that Aetna's policies contain aggregate limits 
equal to their per-occurrence limits, Chemical Leaman 
contends that allocation of the $11,055,000 among 
Chemical Leaman's various contamination sites is 
necessary. Moreover, Chemical Leaman claims that the 
excess insurers should be bound by Chemical Leaman's 
and Aetna's decision to allocate $5,226,720 to Bridgeport 
because they originally disclaimed coverage. 
 
Chemical Leaman's arguments present at least three 
separate issues of New Jersey law: (1) whether in the event 
of a settlement between an insured and its primary insurer, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Chemical Leaman put forth definitions of these types of limits that 
were subsequently adopted by the District Court. See 987 F.Supp. at 
599 n12. A per-occurrence limit sets a maximum amount payable on a 
particular claim, but does not impact coverage available for other claims 
of the same type. An aggregate limit sets a cumulative amount of 
coverage for all claims of a particular type. See id. 
 
22. Aetna provided total per-occurrence indemnity limits of $55,000 in 
the 1960 policy year; annual per-occurrence limits of $500,000 for policy 
years April 1, 1961, to April 1, 1979; and annual per-occurrence limits 
of $1,000,000 for policy years April 1, 1979, to April 1, 1981. See 
Appellee's Brief at 7. 
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excess insurers are entitled to a credit in the amount paid 
by the primary insurer or in the amount of the relevant 
policy limits; (2) whether, assuming (a) there are aggregate 
policy limits in the primary policies, (b) multiple covered 
sites have been contaminated, and (c) the insured and the 
primary insurer have allocated the settlement payment 
among the various covered sites, the court in thefirst suit 
to go to judgment should afford a full policy limit credit to 
the excess insurers or should limit the credit to the amount 
allocated in the settlement to the site(s) in that suit, leaving 
the excess insurers to assert the remaining credit in 
subsequent cases; and (3) whether the credit, whatever it 
is, should be offset against the total indemnity costs 
involved in the suit, or should first be allocated among the 
relevant policy years and then set off against the indemnity 
cost allocated to that year. 
 
A. Settlement Amount v. Policy Limits 
 
With respect to the first issue, the District Court 
predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt 
the reasoning of UMC/Stamford, Inc. v. Allianz Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 182 (N.J. Super. 1994), the one 
published New Jersey case on point. In UMC, the plaintiffs 
sought coverage for environmental pollution claims under 
various primary and excess insurance policies. After the 
plaintiff settled with primary insurers, a non-settling excess 
insurer moved for disclosure of the settlement amount. See 
id. at 190. Denying the motion, the UMC court reasoned 
that the excess insurer had no need to know the terms of 
the settlement. Instead, it ruled that "an excess carrier is 
entitled to a credit, not based on the primary carrier's 
settlement, but based on the amount allocable to the 
primary under its policies. In other words, the excess carrier 
is entitled to a credit for the full amount of the primary 
carrier's coverage before it is required to pay[under the 
excess policies.]" See id. (emphasis added). 
 
As the District Court noted, the UMC approach tracks "a 
widely-followed corollary to the doctrine that a settlement 
with a primary insurer exhausts the primary coverage. 
Under this approach, the insured forfeits any right to 
coverage of any dollar difference between the settlement 
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amount and the primary insurer's policy limits. The excess 
insurer cannot be made liable for any part of this difference 
because the excess insurer never agreed to pay for losses 
below a specified floor (i.e. below the limits of the 
underlying policy)." 978 F.Supp. at 602 (internal citations 
omitted). This rule prevents the insured from securing a 
double recovery. 
 
We do not disregard a decision of an intermediate 
appellate state court on an issue of controlling state law 
unless we are "convinced by other persuasive data that the 
highest court of the state would decide otherwise." See 
Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 516 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting West v. American Telephone & Tel. Co., 311 
U.S. 223, 237 (1940)). Here, we find no basis for predicting 
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would decide 
otherwise. Accordingly, we hold that the excess insurers are 
entitled to a credit of $11,055,000, even though Chemical 
Leaman alleges that it received only $5,226,720 for its 
claims against Aetna regarding coverage at Bridgeport. 
 
B. Full Credit v. Allocation on Basis of 
Settlement Agreement 
 
We now turn to the issue raised by the fact that the 
primary and excess policies cover sites other than 
Bridgeport that have given rise to claims against Chemical 
Leaman and are the subject of other suits included within 
the Aetna settlement. Chemical Leaman acknowledges that 
if Aetna's policies contain only per-occurrence liability 
limits, as the excess insurers insist, no allocation of the 
settlement amount is required; the excess insurers are, in 
that event, entitled to a credit equal to Aetna's per- 
occurrence limits for each separate occurrence they are 
called upon to cover. Chemical Leaman argues, however, 
that Aetna's policies include an aggregate limit equal to the 
per-occurrence limit and therefore some account must be 
taken of the portion of settlement payment attributable to 
sites other than Bridgeport. 
 
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the Aetna 
policies have aggregate policy limits. We assume, without 
deciding, that they do. Even making that assumption, 
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however, we conclude that where, as here, the primary and 
excess policies cover claims asserted against Chemical 
Leaman based on occurrences wherever they happen, 23 the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey would hold that the excess 
insurers are entitled to a credit equal to the total per- 
occurrence limits in the first suit to go to judgment. By 
granting the excess insurers in a particular year a credit in 
the amount of Aetna's per-occurrence policy limits for that 
year in the instant case, we do not prejudice Chemical 
Leaman or unduly benefit the excess insurers. Chemical 
Leaman may raise the issue of aggregate limits in 
subsequent litigation involving the liability of the excess 
insurers under the applicable policies. 
 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has repeatedly favored 
a pragmatic approach to issues of this kind, choosing the 
rule that will simplify resolution of disputes. See Owens- 
Illinois, 650 A.2d at 993 (seeking efficient and 
administratively simple allocation of liability among various 
insurers); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 
1116, 1124 (N.J. 1998) (noting that the need for"efficient 
response" to the logistical challenge posed by environmental 
insurance litigation constituted factor relevant to allocation 
decisions). Even assuming that Aetna's policies contained 
aggregate limits, we believe the simplest and most 
straightforward approach is to extend the full credit 
amount to the excess insurers initially, rather than 
accepting Chemical Leaman's subjective allocation of this 
amount to the various contamination sites. If we were to 
hold that the excess insurers were only entitled to a credit 
amount of $5,226,750, the District Court would have to 
allocate this amount among the various policy years. 
Allocation of this amount in proportion to the amount of 
insurance purchased from Aetna in each policy year, while 
feasible, is unnecessarily complicating. It is much simpler 
to allow the excess insurers the full credit at Bridgeport 
rather than requiring allocation at each contamination site. 
Moreover, this solution eliminates the need for any court to 
pass on the fairness of Chemical Leaman's subjective 
allocation among the various contamination sites. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. The primary and excess policies cover the same occurrences; neither 
is site specific. 
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Finally, extension of the full credit to the first case 
against the excess insurers that goes to judgment or settles 
eliminates any chance of double recovery by an insured. If, 
for example, the total past and future indemnity costs 
associated with Bridgeport were $10,000,000, and we only 
extended a credit in the amount of $5,226,750 to the 
excess insurers, the excess insurers would be responsible 
for the difference of $4,773,250. Assuming further that the 
total damages to all other sites in the same policy years 
was less than $4,000,000, Chemical Leaman would have 
received a double recovery. Chemical Leaman would have 
received more in response costs from its insurers than it 
was required to pay out. While this may be a case in which 
the likelihood of overrecovery by the insured is remote, we 
believe the Supreme Court of New Jersey would be 
disinclined to adopt a rule that would entail a risk of 
overrecovery. 
 
C. Credit Applied to Total Indemnity Costs v. Allocation 
       Among Relevant Policy Years 
 
While we affirm the District Court's determination that 
the excess insurers are entitled to a settlement credit of 
$11,055,000, we note that the District Court subtracted the 
entire settlement amount from $11,084,226, the total past 
indemnity costs for Bridgeport on the record at that time, 
and determined that the excess insurers would be liable for 
the difference plus all future indemnity costs. This 
wholesale cancellation of the credit did not respect the 
contractual rights of the excess insurers in the various 
policy years. For example, if these past costs were 
responsive entirely to soil contamination, then the excess 
insurers in the policy years 1960-1971 were the recipients 
of the entire $11,055,000 credit and the excess insurers in 
the policy years 1971-1981 were denied the benefit of any 
credit based on Aetna's underlying policy limits. 
 
In order to respect their contractual rights, the excess 
insurers in a particular year should only begin covering 
Chemical Leaman's Bridgeport indemnity costs when the 
total costs allocated to that particular year exceed Aetna's 
policy limits for that year. Thus, on remand, the District 
Court should allocate the $11,055,000 settlement credit 
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according to Aetna's policy limits in each year. In order to 
determine when the costs in a particular year exceed 
Aetna's limits in that year, the District Court should (1) 
allocate all indemnity costs on the updated record as 
between soil, groundwater, and wetlands; (2) allocate the 
costs associated with each medium between the relevant 
policy years according to its Owens-Illinois calculations; and 
(3) calculate the total costs allocated to a particular year by 
adding the soil, groundwater, and wetlands costs for that 
particular year. For example, the excess insurers covering 
the policy year April 1, 1960, to April 1, 1961, should 
receive a credit in the amount of $55,000, Aetna's policy 
limit for that year. The excess insurers in that year should 
only pay for those indemnity costs allocated to that year 
when that amount exceeds $55,000. 
 
V. ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO CHEMICAL LEAMAN 
       BASED ON POLLUTION EXCLUSION 
 
The excess insurers challenge the District Court's 
conclusion on remand that Chemical Leaman was not 
required to absorb a portion of its past and future 
indemnity costs related to soil and wetlands contamination 
at Bridgeport based on the liability-phase determinations 
that pollution exclusions in the 1971-1981 policies barred 
soil and wetlands coverage in those years. The District 
Court based its conclusion on a literal reading of this 
Court's prior opinion. Our opinion stated that we remanded 
for a reallocation "between the [excess] insurers and among 
the triggered [excess] policies." See 89 F.3d at 995. Our 
mandate stated that we remanded the instant case for 
reallocation of damages "among the applicable policies in 
accordance with the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding 
in Owens-Illinois." (JA99) The District Court interpreted our 
use of the term "triggered policies" as limiting allocation of 
all of Chemical Leaman's indemnity costs, beyond those 
covered by Aetna's policies, to those excess policies deemed 
liable in the District Court's previous order. See 978 
F.Supp. at 603. Thus, the District Court concluded that we 
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had "ruled against any allocation back to the plaintiff 
insured on account of the pollution exclusion clauses." Id.24 
 
The District Court's reading of our "triggered policy" 
language is understandable. Nevertheless, the question of 
whether Chemical Leaman was required to share in those 
costs was not before us, and we did not address it in our 
opinion. In this context, we believe the fair import of our 
mandate remanding for reallocation was simply to point out 
that an intervening New Jersey Supreme Court decision 
was controlling and therefore changed the damage 
allocation. 
 
Having decided that our prior opinion does not preclude 
Chemical Leaman from absorbing a portion of its past and 
future indemnity costs related to soil and wetlands 
contamination at Bridgeport, we must decide whether 
requiring Chemical Leaman to bear such costs is 
appropriate under New Jersey law. We rely once again on 
Owens-Illinois. 
 
As indicated previously, the Owens-Illinois Court held 
that in continuous trigger cases--situations where there is 
progressive, indivisible injury--damages should not be 
allocated among insurers under a theory of joint and 
several liability. Rather, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that "allocation should be in proportion to the degree 
of the risks transferred or retained [by the policyholder] 
during the years of exposure." 650 A.2d at 993 (emphasis 
added). To demonstrate how the necessary allocation 
should proceed and reflect periods of self-insurance, the 
Court offered the example of a company that was liable for 
continuous and indivisible damages spanning a nine-year 
period. The Court assumed that the company had 
purchased a constant level of insurance in years four, five, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. As noted above, the District Court deemed the past indemnity costs 
associated with Bridgeport to be covered by the $11,055,000 settlement 
credit and the excess amount properly allocated to groundwater. As a 
result, the District Court allocated only future soil and wetlands 
indemnity costs associated with Bridgeport to the excess insurers. The 
District Court allocated all future soil costs among the 1961 to 1971 
policy years and all future wetlands costs among the 1961 to 1971 policy 
years. 
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and six of the damages period, but had purchased no 
insurance in the remaining years. Accepting the constant 
levels of the policy limits as evidence of constant risks over 
the nine-year period, the Court concluded that the carriers 
on the risk in years four, five, and six should each be 
responsible for one-ninth of the company's losses. See id. at 
994. 
 
While this hypothetical involved periods in which the 
company purchased no insurance, the Court nonetheless 
foresaw the exact issue raised on this appeal. Following this 
hypothetical, the Court noted that "of course, policy limits 
and exclusions must be taken into account." Id. (emphasis 
added). On this appeal, the excess insurers seek to have 
the damages to the soil and wetlands allocated, not only to 
those years when Chemical Leaman had coverage for its 
pollution damages, but also to those years when damages 
continued to occur as part of a continuous and indivisible 
process but for which coverage was barred due to an 
applicable pollution exclusion. The necessary effect of this 
reallocation would be to reduce the amount of damages 
allocated to each year in which the excess policies are liable 
for Chemical Leaman's damages. 
 
Because the failure to purchase any insurance and an 
applicable policy exclusion both involve the retention of risk 
by the insured, we conclude, as suggested by the Owens- 
Illinois Court, that they should be treated similarly when 
allocating liability in accordance with Owens-Illinois and its 
progeny. This does not end our inquiry, however, for as the 
parties note, Owens-Illinois differentiates between a period 
of no insurance that reflects a choice to assume or retain 
a risk and a period of no insurance that reflects an inability 
to obtain coverage. The Owens-Illinois Court indicated that 
"[w]hen periods of no insurance reflect a decision by an 
actor to assume or retain a risk, as opposed to periods 
when coverage for a risk is not available, to expect the risk- 
bearer to share in the allocation is reasonable." Id. at 995. 
We interpret this statement to mean that if insurance was 
not available to Chemical Leaman to cover its pollution 
damages to the soil and wetlands after April 1, 1971, then 
Chemical Leaman should not be required to absorb part of 
its indemnity costs related to those two media. If, however, 
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insurance was available and Chemical Leaman chose not to 
purchase it, then Chemical Leaman should be required to 
shoulder part of those costs. On appeal, the parties 
disagree about whether the insured or the insurer should 
have the burden of proof on the availability of insurance. 
 
While no published New Jersey case has reached this 
exact issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court has previously 
indicated its "inherent reluctance to place the burden of 
proving a negative fact on a litigant." Carter-Wallace, 712 
A.2d at 1126. The Court has noted that, because of the 
difficulties associated with proving a negative, the burden of 
establishing the negative is "something the law rarely, if 
ever, imposes." Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete Inc, 
318 A.2d 1, 10 n.2 (N.J. 1974). Thus, rather than require 
Chemical Leaman to prove that insurance was not available 
to cover its pollution damages to the soil and wetlands after 
1971, we conclude that, under New Jersey law, the 
insurers should bear the burden of proving that insurance 
coverage was available. 
 
If the excess insurers prove on remand that Chemical 
Leaman could have purchased insurance to cover its post- 
1971 damages to the soil and wetlands, Chemical Leaman 
should be required to absorb a portion of its past and 
future indemnity costs for those years in which those two 
media were damaged as part of a continuous and 
indivisible process but for which Chemical Leaman did not 
purchase available insurance. We will remand for the 
necessary factual finding on the availability of insurance, 
and, if necessary, for a reallocation of soil and wetlands 
damages. We note that the jury previously determined that 
damages occurred to the wetlands as part of a continuous 
and indivisible process between April 1, 1971, to April 1, 
1978, and that no further damage occurred to the wetlands 
after April 1, 1978. However, because of the District Court's 
pre-trial ruling that the pollution exclusion in the 1971- 
1981 policies barred coverage for soil contamination, no 
factual findings have been made as to whether damage 
occurred to the soil as part of a continuous and indivisible 
process after April 1, 1971.25 We leave it to the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Because the contaminated rinse water passed through the soil before 
it reached the groundwater and because the jury found continuous and 
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Court's discretion, if allocation of damages to post-1971 
years is found to be necessary, to determine the percentage 
of soil and wetlands damages to be absorbed by Chemical 
Leaman. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
On remand, the District Court should first determine 
whether the excess insurers have rebutted the Fairclough 
presumption. If so, it should allocate the cost associated 
with the government-mandated RI/FS between defense 
costs and indemnity costs. Second, the District Court 
should allocate all indemnity costs on the updated record 
as between soil, groundwater, and wetlands. 
 
After determining the total past indemnity costs for each 
medium, the District Court should then allocate these costs 
among the applicable policy years for each medium. The 
excess insurers have not challenged the District Court's 
allocation of groundwater costs. However, they have 
challenged the District Court's holding that the excess 
insurers are responsible for the entire soil and wetlands 
indemnity costs. On remand, the District Court should 
determine whether insurance was available to Chemical 
Leaman to cover its post-1971 damages to the soil and 
wetlands. If insurance was available after 1971, then 
Chemical Leaman should be required to absorb a portion of 
its past and future indemnity costs for damage to the soil 
and wetlands that occurred after April 1, 1971, as part of 
the continuous and indivisible process of damage begun 
prior to that date. 
 
Finally, the District Court should allocate the 
$11,055,000 credit amount such that the excess insurers 
in a particular policy year receive a credit in the amount of 
Aetna's policy limits for that year. Before the excess 
insurers of a particular policy year are to begin providing 
coverage, the total liability assigned to that policy year--the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
indivisible groundwater damages between 1971-1981, common sense 
suggests that the jury, if faced with the issue, would have found soil 
damage as part of a continuous and indivisible process between 1971- 
1981. However, we make no factual findings of our own on this issue. 
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sum of the soil, groundwater, and wetlands indemnity costs 
--must exceed the limits of Aetna's policy limits in that 
year. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed, and 
this matter will be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Chemical 
Leaman will bear the costs. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                36 
 
